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REFORMING PRODUCTS LIABILITY. By w. Kip Viscusi. Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press. 1991. Pp. xv, 270. $39.95. 
Much of Professor W. Kip Viscusi's past work has focused on oc-
cupational and consumer product safety.1 In his latest book, Re-
forming Products Liability, the author draws on previous articles2 to 
present a series of proposals for products liability reform. He covers a 
smorgasbord of topics, including proper formulation of the design de-
fect test, valuation of damages, liability for warnings, and government 
regulation of safety. 
The author begins by criticizing other dominant approaches to tort 
reform, which he terms "tort reform by anecdote,"3 "tort reform by 
isolated fact,"4 and "tort reform by legal theory and ideology."5 He 
contends that none of these approaches conveys the full truth of the 
liability crisis and sets out to justify his own proposed policies on an 
empirical basis. 
As a first step, Professor Viscosi examines whether a liability crisis 
exists. He first notes that sharply increasing insurance premiums have 
inspired many complaints of a liability crisis; the crisis has generally 
been attributed to changes in liability rules (p. 14). However, altema-
1. W. Kip Viscusi is George G. Allen Professor of Economics, Duke University, and Associ· 
ate Reporter on the American Law Institute tort liability reform project. His prior works in-
clude studies of the impact of workers' compensation on work fatalities, see Michael J. Moore & 
W. Kip Viscusi, Promoting Safety Through Workers' Compensation: The Efficacy and Net Wage 
Costs of Injury Insurance, 20 RAND J. EcoN. 499 (1989), the impact of OSHA regulations on 
workplace safety, see W. Kip Viscusi, The Impact of Occupational Safety and Health Regulation, 
1973-1983, 17 RAND J. EcoN. 567 (1986), and the impact of consumer product regulation on 
consumer safety, see w. KIP VISCUS!, REGULATING CoNSUMER PRODUCT SAFE.TY (1984). 
2. E.g., W. Kip Viscusi, The Performance of Liability Insurance in States with Different Prod-
ucts-Liability Statutes, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 809 (1990); W. Kip Viscusi, Wading Through the 
Muddle of Risk-Utility Analysis, 39 AM. U. L. REV. 573 (1990); W. Kip Viscusi, The Interaction 
Between Product Liability and Workers' Compensation as Ex Post Remedies for Workplace Inju-
ries, 5 J.L. EcoN. & 0RG. 185 (1989); W. Kip Viscusi, Toward a Diminished Role for Tort 
Liability: Social Insurance, Government Regulation, and Contemporary Risks to Health and 
Safety, 6 YALE J. ON REG. 65 (1989). 
3. Viscusi does not identify which authors belong to the school of "tort reform by anecdote." 
One book that does contain an extensive collection of anecdotes is PETER W. HUBER, LIABILITY: 
THE LEGAL REVOLUTION AND ITS CoNSEQUENCES (1988). However, Huber's book does not 
meet the criteria set out by Viscusi for the "school of tort reform by anecdote," which does not 
"consider whether [the] developments are necessarily undesirable" and does not analyze the 
problems. P. 3. While making liberal use of anecdotes, Huber's book also includes analysis. 
Another entertaining book of this genre, albeit with less analysis, is WALTER K. OLSON, THE 
LmGATION EXPLOSION (1991) (reviewed in this issue by Judge Douglas H. Ginsburg.-Ed.). 
4. P. 3. The "isolated fact" under discussion is mushrooming liability insurance premiums. 
Pp. 3-4. The mere fact that liability insurance premiums have risen greatly is not proof by itself 
that the tort system is in crisis; higher premiums could be attributable to the underwriting cycle 
or to a conspiracy by the insurance industcy. P. 4. 
5. P. 4. Viscusi appears to be referring to the Calabresi school; he describes this school as 
"largely responsible for establishing the products liability regime in place today." P. 4. 
1634 
May 1992] Tort and Commercial Law 1635 
tive explanations for the rise in insurance premiums, including fluctu-
ating interest rates and collusive insurance firms, have also been 
suggested (pp. 14-15). Viscusi then tests these theories. Interest rate 
fluctuations, he concludes, do account for some of the variation in pre-
miums (p. 29). On the other hand, low insurance profitability during 
the early 1980s, when the crisis was most acute, implies that any con-
spiracy to hold up rates failed (p. 31). Surveying the ever-increasing 
numbers of products liability cases, Viscusi concludes that "the prod-
ucts liability crisis is neither imaginary nor a contrivance of the insur-
ance industry" (p. 40). · 
Viscusi turns next to the causes of the crisis. His data show that 
total premiums actually increased faster from 1968-1978 (12.6% an-
nual real growth) than from 1978-1988 (5.3%) (pp. 26-27), while at 
the same time the amount of coverage written decreased (p. 29). Ac-
cording to Viscusi, if strict liability - another oft-posited cause of the 
crisis - were the cause of the rise in premiums, the increases in the 
early 1960s should have been greater (p. 28). The greater premium 
increases during the 1970s, as compared with the 1980s, suggest that 
the design defect doctrine and the increased liability for failure to 
warn caused the surge in liability (p. 28). 
To assess design defect claims, many courts use the risk-utility 
analysis proposed by Dean Wade,6 which measures a product's overall 
risks and benefits to decide whether its sale constitutes negligence. 
This analysis considers a product's usefulness and desirability, its 
safety, possible substitutes and modifications, the user's precautions, 
the user's anticipated awareness of the dangers, and potential loss 
spreading. 
Courts relying on the Wade analysis have sometimes· stopped with 
the first factor: the product's usefulness and desirability. In O'Brien v. 
Muskin Corp., 7 a twenty-three-year-old jumped off a garage roof into a 
shallow above-ground pool, sustaining serious injuries. Under Wade's 
test, which it professed to adopt, the court should have considered that 
the user could have minimized - indeed eliminated - the risk 
through responsible behavior. Instead, the court stopped with the first 
factor, finding some products too hazardous to be sold at all. 8 
The first prong of the Wade test invites courts to impose their own 
value notions on others. As Viscusi notes, in a democratic society, 
courts should not decide that some products are not useful or essential 
for the public (p. 74). To avoid this pitfall, Viscusi proposes a more 
objective risk-utility analysis consisting of three separate tests applied 
6. John W. Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort Liability for Products, 44 Miss. L.J. 825 
(1973). 
7. 463 A.2d 298 (N.J. 1983). 
8. P. 73 (discussing O'Brien, 463 A.2d at 306); see also 463 A.2d at 314 (Schreiber, J., con-
curring and dissenting). 
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in sequence. A product's failing any of the tests renders the manufac-
turer liable. The first test - the purchaser's risk-utility index - cal-
culates risks and benefits by weighing consumer utility (willingness to 
pay for the product) against the purchase cost and the unexpected in-
jury costs.9 The test measures the product's value to the consumer by 
using its demand curve, rather than its purchase price.10 Injury costs 
are based on risks that the producer should have foreseen at the time 
of sale, excluding information that becomes available later. 11 If, after 
consideration of unexpected injury costs, the product would have been 
an "attractive purchase on an expected value basis for the average con-
sumer" (p. 79), the first test is met. 
The second test - the private risk-utility test - assesses specific 
product designs. To pass this test, the design must maximize the com-
bined net benefits to the purchaser and producer (p. 79). In addition 
to the factors used in the first test, the second test considers the profit 
to the producer. 
The third test - the social benefit-cost test - weighs the costs 
imposed on society by the product against the benefits from the prod-
uct, such as taxes collected and jobs created. Because courts have lim-
ited ability to conduct social research, Viscusi proposes that 
government agencies, not courts, apply the social benefit-cost test 
through regulatory decisions (p. 80). 
Together, these tests form a "more tightly specified negligence 
standard" (p. 81). Like the Calabresi strict liability approach but un-
like traditional negligence, 12 Viscusi's inquiry focuses on cost-benefit 
tests rather than moral fault (p. 81). Unlike Calabresian theory, how-
ever, Viscusi's formulation does not consider insurance to be a worthy 
objective of tort law. 
Viscusi next analyzes the proper role of hazard warnings. Courts 
imposing warning requirements have not always required evidence 
that the plaintiff would have behaved differently if a warning had been 
present.13 Viscusi notes that warnings should deter risky patterns of 
use, thus shifting responsibility to the consumer to use the product 
9. Unexpected injury costs are used because Viscusi assumes that expected injury costs are 
reflected in the price paid. P. 80. 
10. P. 80 n.34. However, Viscusi does not explain how to determine what price the particu-
lar injured consumer would have been willing to pay for the product. This omission is a major 
shortcoming to actual application of the test. 
11. This is in sharp contrast to the standard applied in Beshada v. Johns-Manville Prod. 
Corp., 447 A.2d 539 (N.J. 1982), in which the New Jersey Supreme Court held an asbestos 
manufacturer liable without evidence that the manufacturer had reason to know of the risks 
posed by asbestos. 
12. See OLIVER W. HOLMES, JR., THE CoMMON LAW 96 (1881). 
13. See HUBER, supra note 3, at 59 (discussing Reyes v. Wyeth Lab., 498 F.2d 1264 (5th 
Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1096 (1974), in which recovery was allowed for insufficient warning 
of vaccine dangers where the child's mother admitted that she had not read the warning 
presented). 
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safely {p. 9). Yet the current liability system impedes the fulfillment of 
this purpose. By imposing penalties for failure to warn but never for 
overwarning, it creates incentives for "information overload," which 
decreases the deterrence utility of all warnings {pp. 139-40). 
Viscusi proposes national standards for warning labels to ensure 
adequate communication of necessary information. As a model, he 
cit.es the warnings adopted by the FDA for pharmaceuticals {pp. 150-
52). These warnings, which target physicians, organize the different 
sections (descriptive information, clinical pharmacology, contraindica-
tions, etc.) in standard layouts so that doctors can locate information 
quickly. Examining the effectiveness of the warnings, the author re-
views the case of tetracycline, an antibiotic that can cause discolora-
tion of the teeth in young children. After warnings appeared in 1963, 
prescriptions of the drug for young children declined rapidly {p. 152). 
Viscusi also proposes standardized wording for warning labels {p. 
155). At present, even labels subject to advance approval by the EPA, 
such as those for pesticides, vary widely in wording for identical 
hazards. Consumers are thus inundated with information that they 
·have trouble sorting out. 14 
Standardized warnings could be very helpful to both producers 
and consumers if clear guidelines - presumably set by a government 
agency {p. 155) - existed. Unfortunately, no one knows - not even 
Professor Viscusi- what information is necessary. Viscusi decries a 
case holding a folding chair manufacturer liable for failing to warn 
that an improperly opened chair could collapse.15 However, he speaks 
approvingly of a requirement to warn softball players that softballs are 
more likely than baseballs to cause brain damage, even when consum-
ers already recognize some risk of brain damage from softballs {p. 
142). If the scope of mandatory warnings continues to expand, even 
standardized warnings will not solve the problem. 
According to Viscusi, in addition to incentives to overwarn, courts 
currently provide inadequate incentives to producers to take other pre-
cautions because damages are not calculated properly {p. 213). As he 
explains, there are two potential measures of noneconomic damages: 
the deterrence value and the insurance value {p. 89). The insurance 
value represents the amount of insurance people would select for the 
injury incurred if they had perfect information. The deterrence value 
quantifies the value of the risk to the individual (e.g., the extra com-
pensation demanded to undergo a 1/10,000 risk of fatal injury) {p. 90). 
Viscusi proposes a sliding scale for damages according to the level of 
14. Viscusi has published previous studies on the problems of hazard labeling and how to 
convey information most effectively. See, e.g., W. KIP VISCUSI & WESLEY A. MAGAT, LEARN-
ING ABOUT RISK: CoNSUMER AND WORKER REsPONSES TO HAzARD INFORMATION (1987); 
W. Kip Viscusi, Predicting the Effects of Food Cancer Risk Warnings on Consumers, 43 FOOD 
DRUG CosM. L.J. 283 (1988). 
15. P. 143. See Kroger Co. Sav-On Store v. Presnell, 515 N.E.2d 538 (Ind. 1987). 
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safety precautions taken by the producer. The insurance value would 
provide a floor for damages (p. 93), while the deterrence value would 
provide a ceiling. As the producer's level of care deviates progres-
sively from the optimal standard, the level of damages would rise to 
the deterrence value. No punitive damages would be allowed (pp. 93-
94). This approach would replace the current overreliance on the in-
surance value. 
Despite the author's claims, this approach to calculating damages 
does not significantly reduce uncertainty. As an example of the under-
valuation of human life, ViS'cusi cites the Ford Pinto case, in which 
Ford decided not to modify the design of the Pinto gas tank based on 
calculations that it would pay only $200,000 for each life lost due to 
the defect (pp. 111-13). Viscusi claims that $5 million would have 
been a more appropriate figure to use, because it would have been 
closer to the deterrence value (p. 112). If society is to encourage such 
cost-benefit analyses, it will be vital to supply reliable figures for pro-
ducers to use in valuing life. Viscusi, however, does not supply a 
source for such figures, although government agencies have calculated 
values of life varying between $100,000 and $132 million (pp. 119-20). 
Viscusi's own occupational studies of deterrence values, calculated by 
correlating wage differentials with occupational risk, show that most 
workers value their own lives at between $1 million and $10 million 
(p. 108). A firm selling products has no ready method to calculate the 
risk-averseness of its customers. 
Viscusi bemoans the fact that firms "pay cut-rate prices for the 
injuries their products inflict" (p. 213). Elsewhere, though, the author 
admits that "utilization of the deterrence values of injury across the 
board is excessive except when firms completely ignore safety" (p. 115, 
emphasis added). Far from completely ignoring safety, Ford at-
tempted to calculate the risks and benefits of the design assuming it 
would be liable. Viscusi uses a value of $5 million per life to show the 
calculation that Ford should have made (p. 112). Because even gov-
ernment agencies use widely varying values of life in their calculations 
(p. 120), where Ford could have obtained the correct value is unclear. 
Viscusi discusses at length the use of tort liability as insurance, 
concluding that it is generally ill-suited to that role. 16 While adminis-
tration of insurance consumes twenty percent of premiums, adminis-
tration of the tort system consumes over half of the total resources 
expended on liability (pp. 7S:·76). Long delays and uncertainty about 
recovery also plague the tort system. Another problem with insurance 
is moral hazard, which occurs when insurance leads the insured to 
16. In criticizing the tort system as an insurer, Viscusi finds himself in good company. See, 
e.g., HUBER, supra note 3, at 150; Stephen D. Sugarman, Doing Away with Personal Injury Law, 
in PERSPECTIVES ON TORT LAW 126 (Robert L. Rabin ed., 1990). 
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take fewer precautions. Viscusi is aware of this problem, 17 but fails to 
specify under what circumstances, if any, contributory negligence or 
outright misuse would bar or reduce recovery. 18 
The tort system provides particularly ineffective insurance for 
products with delayed effects, such as pharmaceuticals.19 If unfore-
seen health risks emerge decades after sale of a product, manufactur-
ers frequently cannot recover those costs through current sales, 
because current consumers do not receive benefits in relation to the 
costs. This is exacerbated by potential competition from new market 
entrants, particularly foreign companies, which do not bear the "tail" 
of liability from past sales.20 
Design defects pose a further challenge to the concept of the tort 
system as insurer. Insurance relies on uncorrelated risks pooled in a 
single portfolio (p. 76). In design defect cases, however, the risks are 
correlated. If the whole product line is defective, Viscusi argues, it is 
impossible to recover the injury costs from the consumers or the pro-
dricers. 21 As in the case of asbestos, a major defect may shut down the 
industry rather than spread risk (p. 76). Adequate compensation may 
then be impossible due to limited industry assets. 
According to the author, government regulation addresses many 
product risks more effectively than tort liability (p. 118). While the 
tort system undervalues noneconomic damages, such as loss of life, 
regulatory agencies may overvalue them when setting safety standards 
(p. 119). Thus, when agencies regulate actively, tort liability should be 
unnecessary to ensure adequate safety precautions. 
Regulations have shortcomings, however. For instance, they do 
not cover all areas of product design. Also, lax enforcement by some 
17. P. 76. Viscusi's intriguing research on the effect of child-proof caps on storage precau-
tions, which illustrates a phenomenon related to moral hazard, is described infra at text accom-
panying notes 23-24. 
18. The closest he comes to developing such a test is to say, "[c]onsumers may be disap-
pointed when cars driven into a lake do not float, but a failure to meet these expectations does 
not imply that the product is defective." P. 72. 
19. Pp. 76-77. Because the "insurance premium" foreseen by products liability theory is not 
charged up front (since no risk is evident), the tort system fails as an effective insurer for mass 
torts. Focusing on asbestos, Agent Orange, and the Dalkon Shield, Viscusi deplores the high 
litigation costs and widely varying verdicts obtained by comparable victims. Given increased 
regulatory activity, he argues that deterrence from the tort system is no longer necessary for 
asbestos. P. 172. He then abandons the compensation rationale altogether: "When compensa-
tion fails to provide deterrence, presumably victims of product-related disease should be treated 
the same as victims of diseases of unknown origin ...• " P. 172. Social programs such as Social 
Security disability insurance, not the tort system, should compensate asbestos victims. Pp. 172-
73. 
20. HUBER, supra note 3, at 229-30. As Viscusi points out, efforts by manufacturers of small 
planes to tack on liability from past sales have simply resulted in sharp sales declines. P. 40. 
21. P. 76. This point assumes that every defective product causes an injury, which is not 
necessarily the case. Most Ford Pinto drivers, after all, were never involved in rear-end crashes. 
Even in the case of the Dalkon Shield or DES, the injury rates from use were well under 100%. 
See HUBER, supra note 3, at 81. 
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agencies greatly reduces deterrence in some areas.22 More fundamen-
tally, regulations may ignore behavioral responses (p. 123). An earlier 
study by the author examined the effect of "child-proof" caps on 
medicin~ containers.23 Viscusi's study found that the caps lulled par-
ents into a false sense of security and careless storage resulted. 
Although the percentage of aspirin sold with child-proof caps re-
mained relatively constant from 1972 to 1978, poisonings from child-
proof bottles rose from forty percent to seventy-three percent of all 
aspirin poisonings in the same period (p. 124). 
Despite these shortcomings, the author would exempt firms from 
liability for design defects if they can demonstrate "either compliance 
with a specific government regulation or the use of a hazard warnings 
program that is sufficiently effective that it leads to informed market 
decisions."24 Firms complying with safety regulations should not be 
required to provide higher, inefficient levels of safety (p. 129). 
Viscusi's proposal remedies little of the uncertainty of the present 
system. In contrast to Viscusi's approach, Peter Huber has proposed 
compliance with government regulations as an absolute defense in 
"comprehensively" regulated industries, such as nuclear power and 
pharmaceuticals.25 Huber's proposal, if implemented, would remove 
the uncertainties of the liability system for those industries. Viscusi's 
proposal, however, leaves liability protection to be decided case by 
case. To reveal the uncertainty of his approach, one need only look at 
the author's analysis of the Ford case. The Ford Pinto was in compli-
ance with specific government standards for gas tanks, 26 but Viscusi 
still finds that Ford was properly held liable (pp. 111-13). 
Reforming Products Liability is laden with trenchant criticisms of 
the current liability system. Unfortunately, with some exceptions, the 
author's own proposals for products liability reform are subject to 
equally serious criticism. Although Viscosi presents an extensive em-
pirical analysis of several aspects of the current tort system, his solu-
tions fail to provide clear rules. For example, his risk-utility test 
would remove the emphasis on fault by looking only at cost-benefit 
analyses. In practice, though, this distinction would probably break 
22. Pp. 121-22. The author praises workers' compensation as an effective safety incentive 
which has decreased work-related fatalities by almost 30%. P. 178. In contrast, OSHA has only 
reduced injuries by at most two to four percent. P. 178. Workers pay for the gains in safety by 
accepting lower wages than they would otherwise earn. P. 179. Workers' compensation, like the 
tort system, charges costs of injury to the specific employer. Given Professor Viscusi's enthusi-
asm for workers' compensation and low regard for OSHA, it is somewhat surprising that Profes-
sor Viscusi is so sanguine about the prospects of safety enforced by agencies. 
23. See W. Kip Viscusi, The Lulling Effect: The Impact of Child-Resistant Packaging on 
Aspirin and Analgesic Ingestions, AM. EcoN. REv., May 1984, at 324. 
24. P. 128. Tort liability would remain the main recourse in the case of manufacturing de· 
fects. P. 131. 
25. HUBER, supra note 3, at 213-15. 
26. HUBER, supra note 3, at ll5. 
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down. Under Viscusi's test, the manufacturer must still prove both 
that it had no knowledge of the specified risk and that it had no reason 
to know; the latter inquiry will inevitably focus on whether the manu-
facturer was at fault for failing to conduct adequate research. 
Also, while Viscusi's proposal on damages purports to remove 
some of the uncertainty of the current regime and its lottery-like puni-
tive damage awards, it probably would not work in practice. A sliding 
scale of damages based on how close the producer comes to the correct 
standard of safety would in practice be just as subjective as a determi-
nation under the current system. 
Reforming Products Liability presents an impressive collection of 
empirical data and painstakingly reviews various interrelated aspects 
of the tort system. Overall, however, it is disappointing. Viscusi be-
, gins by mapping an apparently clear path around the swamp of cur-
rent tort doctrine, covering many of the weightiest issues in tort 
reform: the standard of liability; the importance of liability rules; the 
value of injuries; the role of warnings; and the role of government reg-
ulation. As the reader follows the path and examines the solutions in 
detail, though, he gradually slips off the path and winds up back in the 
swamp. 
- Suzanne M. Lambert 
